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Abstract
Existing techniques used for intrusion detection do not fully utilize the intrinsic properties of
embedded systems. In this paper, we propose a lightweight method for detecting anomalous execu-
tions using a distribution of system call frequencies. We use a cluster analysis to learn the legitimate
execution contexts of embedded applications and then monitor them at run-time to capture abnor-
mal executions. We also present an architectural framework with minor processor modifications to
aid in this process. Our prototype shows that the proposed method can effectively detect anomalous
executions without relying on sophisticated analyses or affecting the critical execution paths.
1 Introduction
An increasing number of attacks are targeting embedded systems [21, 37] that compromise the security,
and hence safety, of such systems. It is not an easy task to retrofit embedded systems with security
mechanisms that were developed for more general purpose scenarios since the former (a) have constraints
in processing power, memory, battery life, etc. and (b) are required to meet stringent requirements such
as timing constraints.
Traditional behavior-based intrusion detection systems (IDS) [10] rely on specific signals such as
network traffic [15, 39], control flow [1, 8], system calls [14, 32, 5], etc. The use of system calls, especially
in the form of sequences [14, 16, 44, 29, 12, 40], has been extensively studied in behavior-based IDSes
for general purpose systems since many malicious activities often use system calls to execute privileged
operations on system resources. Because server, desktop and mobile applications exhibit rich, wildly
varying behaviors across executions, such IDSes need to rely either (a) on complex models of normal
behavior, which are expensive to run and thus unsuitable for an embedded system, or (b) on simple,
partial models, which validate only small windows of the application execution at a time. This opens
the door for attacks where variations of a valid execution sequence are replayed with slightly different
parameters to achieve a malicious goal; on the other hand, the application would not execute that
sequence of operations in a normal manner, every time.
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Figure 1: An example system call frequency distribution (SCFD).
We observe that the very properties of embedded systems also make them amenable to the use
of certain security mechanisms. The regularity in their execution patterns means that we can detect
intrusions by monitoring the behavior of such applications [30, 45, 47, 46]; deviations from expected
behavior can be considered to be malicious since the set of what constitutes legitimate behavior is often
limited by design. In this paper we present an intrusion detection mechanism for embedded systems
using a system call frequency distribution (SCFD). Figure 1 presents an example. It represents the
numbers of occurrences of each system call type for each execution run of an application. The key idea
is that the normal executions of an application whose behavior is predictable can be modeled by a small
set of distinct system call distributions, each of which corresponds to a high-level execution context. We
use a cluster analysis to learn distinct execution contexts from a set of SCFDs and to detect anomalous
behavior using a similarity metric explained in Section 3.
Our detection method is lightweight, has a deterministic time complexity – hence, it fits well for
resource-constrained embedded systems. This is due to the coarse-grained and concise representation
of SCFDs. Although it can be implemented either at the operating system layer [33] or even used for
offline analysis, we demonstrate an implementation on the SecureCore architecture [45] that increases
security. In Section 4, we show that minor modifications to a modern multicore processor enables us to
monitor and analyze the run-time system call usage of applications in a secure, non-intrusive manner.
We implemented our prototype on Simics, a full-system simulator [27]. Due to the inherent limita-
tions in simulation environment, we developed a proof-of-concept implementation based on an example
embedded application and various attack scenarios that highlight the mechanism and benefits of the
SCFD-based intrusion detection and also its limitations. The experimental results show that SCFDs
can effectively detect certain types of abnormal execution contexts that are difficult for traditional
sequence-based approaches [6, 40]. Detailed results including a comparison with an existing sequence-
based technique is presented in Sections 5 and 6.
Hence, the high level contributions of this paper are:
1. we introduce a lightweight method, utilizing the predictable nature of embedded system behaviors,
with a deterministic time complexity for detecting anomalous execution contexts of embedded
systems based on the distribution of system call frequencies (Section 3);
2. we present an architectural framework based on the SecureCore architecture for secure, non-
intrusive monitoring and analysis of SCFDs (Section 4);
3. we demonstrate our techniques on a prototype implementation and evaluate its advantages and
limitations using various attack scenarios that include a real attack (Sections 5 and 6).
2 Overview
The main idea behind SCFD is to learn the normal system call profiles, i.e., patterns in system call
frequency distributions, collected during legitimate executions of a sanitized system. Analyzing profiles is
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Figure 2: Sample sequence of system calls made by the target embedded application used in the
evaluation (Section 5). The top sequence is from a normal execution. The bottom one is when a
malicious code uses the exact same routine used by the normal execution for image uploading. The
transition (that is underlined) is legitimate with respect to the set of legitimate sequences, and thus a
sequence-based approach may fail to detect the malicious upload.2
challenging especially when such profiles change, often dramatically, depending on the execution modes
and inputs. We address this issue by clustering the distribution of system calls capturing legitimate
behavior. Each cluster then can be a signature that represents a high-level execution context, either in
a specific mode or for similar input data. Then, given an observation at run-time, we test how similar
it is to each previously calculated cluster. If there is no strong statistical evidence that it is a result of
a specific execution context then we consider the execution to be malicious with respect to the learned
model.
Attacks against sequence-based IDSes: Although sequence-based methods can capture detailed,
temporal relations in system call usages, they may fail to detect abnormal execution contexts. This
is because most sequence-based approaches rather profile the local, temporal relations among system
calls within a limited time frame. Figure 2 highlights such a case. The sequence at the top is obtained
from a part of normal execution of the target embedded application used in our evaluation (Section 5).
A smart attacker may use the very same routine to circumvent the detection process and upload the
image to its own server right after the normal image uploading operation completes, as shown at the
bottom. A sequence-based method may not detect this malicious activity if the model parameter (e.g.,
the sequence length or the Markovian order [6]) is not carefully chosen, since the transition cl-mu-wr-so
is not abnormal with respect to what can be observed during normal executions.
In contrast to sequence-based techniques, our SCFD method may fail to detect a small local variation
in system call sequences. However, as we show in this paper, it can easily detect abnormal deviations in
high-level, naturally variable execution contexts such as the one illustrated above (Figure 2) since the
SCFD significantly changes due to the malicious execution. Also, if the attacker corrupts the integrity
of the data (for instance, replaces the input or changes its size to downgrade its quality) then our
method is able to detect such problems – this is not easy for sequence-based methods as we explain in
Section 6.3. Hence, by using these two approaches together, one can improve the overall accuracy of
the system call-based IDS for embedded systems.
Assumptions and Adversary Model: The following assumptions are made in this paper:
1. We consider an embedded application that executes in a repetitive fashion – We monitor and
perform a legitimacy test at the end of each invocation of a task.
2. We limit ourselves to applications of which most of the possible execution contexts can be profiled
ahead of time. Hence, the behavior model is learned under the stationarity assumption – this is
a general requirement of most behavior-based IDS. This can be justified by the fact that most
2Abbreviations: access, close, connect, execve, fstat, getuid, mmap, munmap, open, read, sendto, socket, stat,
write
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embedded applications have a limited set of execution modes and input data fall within fairly
narrow ranges. Also, a significant amount of analysis of embedded systems is carried out post-
design/implementation anyways for a variety of reasons (to guarantee predictable behavior for
instance). Hence, the information about the usage of system calls can be rolled into such a-priori
analysis. Our method may not work well for applications that do not exhibit execution regularities
(e.g., due to frequent user interactions).
3. The initial state of the application is trustworthy. The profiling is carried out prior to system
deployment. Also, any updates to the applications must be accompanied by a repeat of the
profiling process. The application(s) could be compromised after the profiling stage, but we
assume that the stored profile(s) cannot be tampered with. Again, such (repeat) analysis is
typical in such systems – e.g., anytime the system receives updates, including changes to the
operating system or the processor architecture.
4. We consider threat models that involve changes to the behavior of system call usage. If an attack
does not invoke or change any system calls, the activity at least has to affect executions afterward
so that the future system call usage may change. The methods in this paper, as they stand,
cannot detect attacks that never alter system call usage and that just replace certain system calls
by hijacking them (e.g., altering kernel system call table) [41].
5. We consider malicious code that can be secretly embedded in the application, either by remote
attacks or during upgrades. The malicious code activates itself at some point after system initial-
ization. We are not directly concerned with how the malicious code gained entry, but focus more
on what happens after that.
As mentioned above, we assume that malware will exhibit a different pattern of system call usage.
For example, malware that leaks out a sensitive information would make use of network-related system
calls (e.g., socket, connect, write, etc.) thus changing the frequencies of these calls.
3 Intrusion Detection Using Execution Contexts Learned from
System Call Distributions
We now present our novel methods to detect abnormal execution contexts in embedded applications by
monitoring changes in system call frequency distributions.
3.1 Definitions
Let S = {s1, s2, . . . , sD} be the set of all system calls provided by an operating system, where sd
represents the system call of type d. During the nth execution of an application, it calls a multiset
σn of S. Let us denote the nth system call frequency distribution (or just system call distribution) as
xn = [m(σn, s1),m(σ
n, s2), . . . ,m(σ
n, sD)]
T , where m(σn, sd) is the multiplicity of the system call of
type d in σn. Hereafter, we simplify m(σn, sd) as xnd . Thus, x
n = [xn1 , x
n
2 , . . . , x
n
D]
T .
We define a training set, i.e., the execution profiles of a sanitized system, as a set of N system call
frequency distributions collected from N executions, and is denoted by X = [x1,x2, . . . ,xN ]T . The
clustering algorithm (Section 3.3) then maps each xn ∈ ND to a cluster ci ∈ C = {c1, c2, . . . , ck}. We
denote by c : {x1, · · · ,xN} → C the cluster that xn ∈ X belongs to.
3.2 Learning a Single Execution Context
The variations in the usage of system calls will be limited if the application under monitoring has a
simple execution context. In such a case, it is reasonable to consider that the executions follow a certain
distribution of system call frequencies, clustered around a centroid, and cause a small variation from it
4
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Figure 3: System call frequency distributions for S = {s1, s2} and clusters. The gray-colored objects
are SCFDs in the training set. Each star-shaped point inside each cluster is its centroid. The ellipsoid
around each cluster draws the cutoff line of the cluster; the points inside of the line are legitimate with
respect to the cluster.
due to, for example, input data or execution flow. This is a valid model for many embedded systems
since the code in such system tends to be fairly limited in what it can do. Hence, such analysis is quite
powerful in detecting variations and thus catching intrusions.
For a multivariate distribution, the mean vector µ = [µ1, µ2, . . . ,µD]T , where µd = (
∑N
n x
n
d )/N ,
can be used as the centroid. Figure 3 plots the frequency distributions of two system call types (i.e.,
D = 2). For now, let us consider only the data points (triangles) on the left-hand side of the graph. The
data points are clustered around the star-shaped marker that indicates the centroid of the distribution
formed by the points. Now, given a new observation from the monitoring phase, e.g., the point marked
‘A’, a legitimacy test can be devised that tests the likelihood that such an observation is actually part of
the expected execution context. This can be done by measuring how far the new observation is from
the centroid. Here, the key consideration is on the distance measure for testing legitimacy.
One may use the Euclidean distance between the new observation x∗ and the mean vector of a
cluster, i.e., ||x∗ − µ|| = √(x∗ − µ)T (x∗ − µ). Although the Euclidean distance (or L2-norm) is
simple and straightforward to use, the distance is built on a strong assumption that each coordinate
(dimension) contributes equally while computing the distance. In other words, the same amount of
differences in xn1 and xn2 are considered equivalent even if, e.g., a small variation in the usage of system
call s2 is the stronger indicator of abnormality than system call s1. Thus, it is more desirable to allow
such a variable contribute more. For this reason, we use the Mahalanobis distance [28], defined as:
distM (x
n,X) =
√
(xn − µ)TΣ−1(xn − µ),
for a group of data set X, where Σ is the covariance matrix of X.3 Notice that the existence of Σ−1 is
the necessary condition to define the Mahalanobis distance; i.e., the difference of the frequency of each
system call from the mean (i.e., what is expected) is augmented by the inverse of its variance.
Accordingly, if we observe a small variance for certain system calls during the training, e.g., execve
or socket, we would expect to see a similar, small, variation in the usage of the system calls during
3Σ is the positive definite. If we set Σ = I, the Mahalanobis distance is equivalent to the Euclidean distance. Thus,
the Mahalanobis distance is more expressive than the Euclidean distance.
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actual executions as well. On the other hand, if the variance of a certain system call type is large, e.g.,
read or write, the Mahalanobis distance metric gives a small weight to it in order to keep the distance
(i.e., abnormality) less sensitive to changes in such system calls. Cluster 2 in Figure 3 shows an example
of the advantage of using the Mahalanobis distance over the Euclidean distance. Although C is closer
to the centroid than B is in terms of the Euclidean distance, it is more reasonable to determine that
C is an outlier and B is legitimate because we have not seen (during the normal executions) frequency
distributions such as the one exhibited by C while we have seen a statistically meaningful amount of
examples like B. As an extreme case, let us consider D which is quite close to Cluster 3’s center in
terms of the Euclidean distance. However, it should be considered malicious because s2 (i.e. the y-axis)
should never vary.
Using covariance values also make it possible to learn dependencies among different system call types.
For instance, an occurrence of the socket call usually accompanies open and many read or write calls.
Thus, we can easily expect that changes in socket’s frequency would also lead to variations in the
frequencies of open, read and write. Cluster 1 in Figure 3 is such an example that shows covariance
between the two system call types. On the other hand, they are independent in Cluster 2 and 3. Thus,
using the Mahalanobis distance we can not only learn how many occurrences of each individual system
call should exist but also how they should vary together.
Now, given a set of system call distributions, X = [x1,x2, . . . ,xN ]T , we calculate the mean vector,
µ, and the covariance matrix, Σ, for this data set. It then can be represented as a single cluster, c,
whose centroid is defined as (µ,Σ). Now, the Mahalanobis distance of a newly observed SCFD, x∗,
from the centroid is
dist(x∗, c) =
√
(x∗ − µ)TΣ−1(x∗ − µ). (1)
If this distance is greater than a cutoff distance θ, we consider that the execution to be malicious.
For example, B in Figure 3 is considered legitimate w.r.t. Cluster 2. One analytic way to derive this
threshold, θ, is to think of the Mahalanobis distance w.r.t. the multinomial normal distribution,
p(x∗) =
√
|Σ|(2pi)D
−1
exp
(
− 1
2
dist(x∗, c)2
)
. (2)
That is, we can choose a θ such that the p-value under the null hypothesis is less than a significant level
p0, e.g., 1% or 5%. Appendix A explains how to calculate θ given a p0.
3.3 Learning Multiple Execution Contexts Using Global k-means
In general, an application may show widely varying system call distributions due to multiple execution
modes and varying inputs. In such scenarios, finding a single cluster/centroid for the whole set can
result in inaccurate models because it would include many non-legitimate points that belong to none of
the execution contexts – i.e., the empty space between clusters in Figure 3. Thus, it is more desirable to
consider that observations are generated from a set of distinct distributions, each of which corresponds
to one or more execution contexts. Then, the legitimacy test for a new observation x∗ is reduced to
identifying the most probable cluster that may have generated x∗. If there is no strong evidence that
x∗ is a result of an execution corresponding to any cluster then we determine that x∗ is most likely due
to malicious execution.
Suppose we collect a training set X = [x1,x2, . . . ,xN ]T where xn ∈ ND. To learn the distinct
distributions, we use the k-means algorithm [24] to partition the N data points on a D-dimensional
space into k clusters. The k-means algorithm works as follows:
1. Initialization: Create k initial clusters by picking k random data points from X.
2. Assignment: For each xn ∈ X, assign it to the closest cluster c(xn), i.e.,
c(xn) = arg min
ck∈C
dist(xn, ck). (3)
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ALGORITHM 1: Global k-means(X, MAXK, BoundTD)
1: {X: the training set}
2: {MAXK: the maximum number of clusters}
3: {BoundTD: the total distance bound}
4: Create c1 with X. Calculate µ1 and Σ1.
5: C ← {c1}
6: k ← 2
7: MinTD ←∞
8: while k ≤ MAXK or total-dist(X, C) > BoundTD do
9: for n = 1, . . . , N do
10: Create ck with xn as its initial point.
11: C′ ←k-means(X, C ∪ ck)
12: if total-dist(X, C′) < MinTD then
13: {Note: The best clustering for k so far}
14: C∗ ← C′
15: MinTD ← total-dist(X, C′)
16: end if
17: end for
18: C ← C∗
19: k ← k + 1
20: end while
21: return C
3. Update: Re-compute the centroid (i.e., µ and Σ) of each cluster based on the new assignments.
The algorithm repeats steps (2) and (3) until the assignments stop changing. Intuitively speaking, the
algorithm keeps updating the k centroids until the total distance of each point xn to its cluster,
total-dist(X, C) =
N∑
n=1
dist(xn, c(xn)), (4)
is minimized.
The k-means algorithm requires a strong assumption that we already know k, the number of clusters.
However, this assumption does not hold in reality because the number of distinct execution contexts
is not known ahead of time. Moreover, the accuracy of the final model heavily depends on the initial
clusters chosen randomly.4 Hence, we use the global k-means method [23] to find the number of clusters
as well as the initial assignments that lead to deterministic accuracy. Algorithm 1 illustrates the global
k-means algorithm. Given a training set X of N system call frequency distributions, the algorithm finds
the best number of clusters and assignments. This is an incremental learning algorithm that starts from
a single cluster, c1, consisting of the entire data set. In the case of k = 2, the algorithm considers each
xn ∈ X as the initial point for c2 and runs the assignment and updates steps of k-means algorithm.
After N trials, we select the final centroids that resulted in the smallest total distance calculated by
Eq. (4). These two centroids are then used as the initial points for the two clusters, respectively, in the
case of k = 3. This procedure repeats until either k reaches a pre-defined MAXK, the maximum number
of clusters, or the total distance value becomes less than the total distance bound BoundTD. Note that
the total distance in Eq. (4) decreases monotonically with the number of clusters. For example, if every
point is its own cluster then the total distance is zero since each point itself is the centroid.
4Finding the optimal assignment in the k-means algorithm with the Euclidean distance is NP-hard. Thus, finding the
optimal assignments with the Mahalanobis distance is at least NP-hard because the Mahalanobis distance is more general
than the Euclidean distance.
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The original algorithm assumes the Euclidean distance. As explained above, we use the Mahalanobis
distance as in Eq. (1). Meanwhile, k-means(X, C) (line 11) is the standard k-means algorithm without
the random initialization; it assigns the points in X to a ck ∈ C, update the centroids, repeats until
stops, and then returns the clusters with the updated centroids. The standard k-means algorithm uses
the Euclidean distance and thus the centroids of the initial clusters are the data points that were picked
first. Remember, however, that the Mahalanobis distance requires a covariance matrix. Since there
would be only one data point in each initial cluster we use the global covariance matrix of the entire
data set X for the initial clusters. After the first iteration, however, the covariance matrix of each
cluster is updated using the data points assigned to it.
The clustering algorithm finally assigns each data point in the training set into a cluster. Then,
each cluster ci ∈ C can be represented by the centroid, (µi,Σi), that now makes it possible to calculate
the Mahalanobis distance of a newly observed SCFD x∗ to each cluster using Eq. (1). The legitimacy
test of x∗ is then performed by finding the closest cluster, c∗, using Eq. (3). Thus, if
dist(x∗, c∗) = min
ci∈C
dist(x∗, ci) > θ
for a given threshold θ, we determine that the execution does not fall into any of the execution contexts
specified by the clusters since dist(x∗, ci) > θ for all i = 1, . . . , k. We then consider the execution to be
malicious. As an example, for the new observation C in Figure 3, Cluster 2 is the closest one and C is
outside its cutoff distance. Thus, we consider that C is malicious. Note that, as shown in the figure,
the same cutoff distance defines different ellipsoids for different clusters; each ellipsoid is a equidistant
line from the mean vector measured in terms of the Mahalanobis distance. Thus, a cluster with small
variances (i.e., less varying execution context) would have a smaller ellipsoid in the Euclidean space.
3.4 Dimensionality Reduction
The number of system call types, i.e., D, is quite large in general. Thus, the matrix calculations in Eq.
(1) might result in an unacceptable amount of analysis overhead.5 However, embedded applications
normally use a limited subset of system calls. Furthermore, we can significantly reduce the dimension-
ality by ignoring system call types that never vary. Consider Cluster 3 from Figure 3. Here, x2 can
be ignored since we can reasonably expect it to never vary during the normal execution.6 Thus, before
running the clustering algorithm, we reduce S to S ′ = {sd1 , sd2 , . . . , sD′}, where D′ ≤ D, such that the
variance of xd for each sd ∈ S ′ is non-zero in the entire training set X. However, we should still be
able to detect any changes in such system calls that never varied (including those that never appeared).
Thus, we merge all such xd in S − S ′; the sum should not change in normal executions. In case D′ is
still large, one may apply a statistical dimensionality reduction technique such as Principal Component
Analysis (PCA) [18] or Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) [13].
4 Architectural Support for SCFD Monitoring
Most the existing system call-based intrusion detection systems rely on the operating system to provide
the information, say, by use of auditing modules [38, 33]. While this provides the ability to monitor
extensive resources such as system call arguments, it requires the operating system itself to be trust-
worthy. In this paper we avoid this problem by proposing a new architectural framework that requires
minor micro-architecture modifications. The architecture builds upon the SecureCore architecture [45]
that enables a trusted on-chip entity, e.g., a secure core, to continuously monitor the run-time behavior
of applications on another, potentially untrusted entity, the monitored core, in a non-intrusive manner.
5Note that µ and Σ values are calculated from the clustering algorithm which is an offline analysis. Thus we store
Σ−1 for computational efficiency.
6In fact, s2 cannot be ignored in the example depicted in Figure 3 since its variance is non-zero in clusters 1 and 2.
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Figure 4: The SecureCore architecture for SCFD monitoring. The SCTM traces the system calls made
by applications running on the monitored core. The traces, written in the SPM, are retrieved by the
secure monitor to perform legitimacy test for the executions.
In this section we describe the modifications to SecureCore that enable us to monitor system calls. We
refer interested readers to [45] for the full details about the SecureCore architecture.
4.1 Overview
Figure 4 shows the overall architecture for system call monitoring. It consists of (a) a secure core, (b)
a monitored core, (c) an on-chip system call tracing module (SCTM) and (d) a scratch pad memory
(SPM). The secure core uses the SCTM and SPM to monitor the usage of system calls by applications
executing on the monitored core. The SCTM extracts relevant information from the monitored core
and then writes it to the SPM. A monitoring process on the secure core then uses this information to
check whether the run-time behavior has deviated from the expected behavior that we profiled using
the method described in Section 3.
Note: We capture the profile of normal executions in a similar manner: the monitoring process
collects SCFDs using the SCTM and SPM under trusted conditions. We then apply the learning
algorithm from Section 3. The resulting normal profile (one per application) is then stored in a secure
memory location.
4.2 System Call Tracing Module (SCTM)
The system call tracing module (SCTM) tracks how many times each application on the monitored core
uses each system call type (i.e., SCFDs). The main point is to catch the moment each call is invoked.
We are able to do this because, in most processor architectures, a specific instruction is designated
for this very purpose, i.e., for triggering system calls. The calling conventions vary across processor
architectures and operating systems. In the PowerPC architecture, that our prototype is based on, an
sc instruction issues a system call based on a number stored in the r0 register [11]. The actual call is
then handled by the operating system kernel. Hence, the execution of the sc instruction denotes the
invocation of a system call.
Another piece of information that we require is who initiated the call; hence we introduce a new
instruction to help with identifying the requester. Figure 5(a) describes the process by which the SCTM
gathers the required information from an application. When an application starts, it registers its Appli-
cation ID (AID) and Process ID with the SCTM. Here, the AID is a unique numerical value assigned
to each application. It is used to let the secure monitor (on the secure core) locate the correct profile.
Once the registration is complete, the secure monitor is able to map each application to corresponding
PIDs. The above registration process is carried out by a special instruction, INST_REG_AID, as described
in the figure.7 The special instruction has other modes as well: (i) INST_BEGIN and (ii) INST_END that
7rlwimi instruction is the Rotate Left Word Immediate Then Mask Insert instruction in the PowerPC ISA [11]. An
execution of rlwimi 0,0,0,0,i for 0 ≤ i ≤ 31 is equivalent to a nop – hence, we used it for our purposes.
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(b) SCFD update in the scratch pad memory (SPM)  
Figure 5: (a) The System Call Tracing Module (SCTM) catches system call executions by looking at
the instruction decoder. (b) Upon execution of a system call, the corresponding counter (e.g., Cnt5 for
open) of the SCFD entry mapped to the application is incremented. The gray areas are for alignment
padding.
demarcate the region where we are tracking the usage of system calls. Once INST_END completes, the
monitor retrieves the data collected from the recently completed region of execution and applies the
detection algorithm. The data is reset with the execution of an INST_BEGIN. While an attacker may
try to execute malicious code block before BEGIN or after END to avoid detection, we can catch such
situations because there should be no system call execution during that point in the code. Thus, in
such cases, the SCTM would immediately raise an alarm. Also, an attack may skip some of all of the
special instructions or modify any of the values. Again, these cannot help the attacker hide malicious
code execution because the system call distribution would need to be consistent with the profile. Also,
watchdog timers can be used to check whether the applications are executing the special instructions
in time.
Figure 5(a) shows how an open system call invocation is detected. As explained above, the system
call number, 5 in Linux, is written to the r0 register. Thus, by looking at the value of the register, we
can track which system call is being invoked. When an sc instruction is executed, SCTM takes the PID
register and the r0 register values. It then updates the corresponding SCFD entry in the scratch pad
memory (see Figure 5(b)). An entry is a contiguous memory region of length 2D+ 4 bytes, where D is
the total number of system calls provided by the OS. Using the PID, SCTM locates the corresponding
entry and then increments the counter of system call d if the value in r0 was d. The sizes of the SPM
and each entry field are implementation-dependent. In our implementation, we assume at most 382
system call types (that are enough to cover most Linux implementations) that results in the size of an
entry being 768 bytes at most. Thus, an SPM of size 8KB can provide a space for around 10 applications
to be monitored simultaneously. The SPM can be accessed only by the secure core. When an INST_END
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Figure 6: The system setup for evaluation. The modified processor architecture (Figure 4 in Section 4)
is implemented on Simics.
is executed, the secure monitor reads the corresponding entry from the SPM,8 a new SCFD, finds the
profile for the corresponding application using the PID to AID map, then verifies the legitimacy of the
SCFD.
5 Evaluation Framework
In this section, we first present the implementation details for our prototype (Section 5.1), the ap-
plication model for our experiments (Section 5.2) and some attack scenarios that are relevant to this
application (Section 5.3).
5.1 System Implementation
We implemented a prototype of our SCFD-based intrusion detection system on Simics [27]. Simics is a
full-system simulator that can emulate a hardware platform including real firmware and device drivers,
and also allows for processor micro-architecture modifications. Figure 6 shows the system setup used
for our evaluation. We used the Freescale MPC8641D [31] development platform on Simics. It has a
dual-core processor, each core of which runs at 1350MHz and the system has a memory of 1GB and
runs an embedded Linux 2.6.23. The SCTM was implemented by extending the sample-user-decoder
on Simics. This allows us to implement the necessary ISA modification as described in Section 4.2. The
SPM has a total size of 8KB.
5.2 Target Application Model
Figure 7(a) shows the target application. Each invocation of the application (period of one second)
cycles through the following steps: (i) retrieve a raw image from a camera, (ii) compresses it to a
JPEG format, (iii) upload the image file to the base station through FTP and finally (iv) write a log
via HTTP post. This type of application model (image capture → processing → communication) can
be found in modern unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that are used for surveillance or environmental
studies [19].
8An interrupt can be raised by SCTM to inform the secure monitor of the execution of INST_END. However, if possible,
it should be avoided because the secure core can be continuously interrupted by a compromised application on the
monitored core thus degrading its ability to perform the monitoring. If necessary, the SCTM should be configured to
block consecutive INST_END instructions. Of course, it is more preferable for the monitor to poll the SCTM.
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Figure 7: The normal execution flow of the target application. Attack 1 and 2 leak user authentication
information and JPEG image through HTTP and FTP, resp., Attack 3 erases the raw image buffer and
Attack 4 is a real-world shellcode that spawns a shell (/bin/sh) by executing execve [36].
The distributions of the system call frequencies exhibited by this application is mainly affected by
the stages after the JPEG compression. While the raw image size is always fixed (e.g., 2.6MB for
1280 x 720 resolution), a JPEG image size can vary (27KB – 97KB) because of compression. This
results in a variance in the number of read and write system calls. To increase the complexity of
the application and also to show certain scenarios that the proposed method cannot deal with well,
we added an additional code branch before the FTP upload stage that behaves as follows: the system
can randomly skip the image upload process (based on a probability of 0.5). This affects the number
of occurrences of network and file-related system calls during actual execution. Hence, the application
has two legitimate flows, Flow 1 and Flow 2 as shown in Figure 8; the figure also shows the system call
types used at each stage of the execution flows.
We use this type of application model for the following reasons: (a) Simics, being a full system simu-
lator that executes on a ‘host’ system, is not fast enough to be able to control an actual system. Hence,
we need to develop an application model that it can simulate; (b) we still need to demonstrate, in the
simplest possible way, how our SCFD-based intrusion detection system works – this application model
is able to highlight the exact mechanisms and even its limitations. Note that this target application
is crafted to show more variance than many real embedded systems. Hence, if our detection method
can catch changes in the system call distributions here then it can detect similar attacks in embedded
systems that show less variance.
5.3 Attack Scenarios
We consider the following attack scenarios for this application:
1. Attack 1 steals user authentication information used to connect to the base station’s FTP server
and sends it to an adversary HTTP server. This attack invokes the same HTTP logging calls used
by the legitimate executions.
2. Attack 2 uploads the image that was just encoded by the application to an adversary FTP server.
This attack also uses the same functions used by a legitimate FTP upload.
3. Attack 3 modifies the raw image array received from the camera. The attack erases the array by
calling memset. This attack does not require any system calls.
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Figure 8: The execution flow of the target application and the system call types used at each stage.
Apart from those shown in the figure, the application used futex, rt_sigreturn and brk system calls.
4. Attack 4 is a real shellcode targeted at Linux on PowerPC and executes execve to spawn a shell
(/bin/sh) [36]. In general, a shellcode can be injected by data sent over a network or from a
file and can be executed by exploiting buffer overflow or format string vulnerabilities. In our
implementation, the shellcode is stored in char shellcode[] and is executed by __asm__("b
shellcode") when enabled.
The attack codes execute at spots marked in Figure 7 when enabled. Note that our method is indepen-
dent of where they happen since SCFDs do not care about the sequences of system calls.
6 Evaluation Results
We now evaluate the SCFD method on the prototype described in the previous section. We also compare
it with an existing sequence-based approach to show how the two methods can be used to complement
each other.
6.1 Training
To obtain the training set, we executed the system under normal conditions (i.e., no attack present)
2, 000 times. The target application used 14 types of system calls (as shown in Figure 8, together with
futex, rt_sigreturn and brk). We used the learning algorithm presented in Section 3 with settings,
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Table 1: The mean and the standard deviation of the system call frequency distributions in the entire
training set and in each cluster after running the learning method. The boldfaced values represent the
system call types whose variance is non-zero.
# pts write read mmap open close fstat munmap socket connect stat Execution context
All 2000 Mean 29.519 101.197 1.520 2.514 4.548 1.520 1.520 2.034 2.034 4.034Stdev 10.602 10.135 0.500 0.500 1.496 0.500 0.500 0.997 0.997 0.998
c1 490
Mean 17.376 91.000 1.000 2.000 3.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 3.000 Small image
No FTP uploadStdev 1.246 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
c2 519
Mean 33.613 108.306 2.000 3.000 6.000 2.000 2.000 3.000 3.000 5.000 Small-medium image
FTP uploadStdev 2.539 1.269 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
c3 506
Mean 43.708 113.354 2.000 3.000 6.000 2.000 2.000 3.000 3.000 5.000 Medium-large image
FTP uploadStdev 4.539 2.269 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
c4 335
Mean 21.176 91.000 1.000 2.000 3.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 2.998 Medium image
No FTP uploadStdev 1.080 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.055
c5 150
Mean 25.575 91.000 1.000 2.000 3.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 3.000 Large image
No FTP uploadStdev 1.627 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
MAXK = 10 and the total distance bound BoundTD of 1, 000 on the resulting traces. The cutoff distance,
θ, which attests to the legitimacy of a new SCFD, is 1.95996; i.e., the significance level is 5%. We also
tested for p0 = 1%, i.e., θ = 2.57583. Again, the lower significance level, the more we are confident
about the statistical significance when an outlier is observed.
Table 1 summarizes the training results. The first row shows the mean and the standard deviation of
the SCFDs in the whole training set. The algorithm first reduce the dimensionality of the results from
14 to 10 by removing the system call types that show zero variance in the training set. The variations
of write and read are due to the JPEG compression and the FTP uploading phases. The latter also
affects the frequencies of the network- and file-related system call types. The global k-means algorithm
stopped at k = 5 (the moment when the total distance becomes less than the bound BoundTD) resulting
in five clusters as shown in the same table.
From these results, note first that the variation of each system call type is significantly reduced
after the clustering; most of them become zero. This is because each cluster contains similar SCFDs,
representing similar execution contexts. Also, from observing the mean values of the system call types
other than write and read, we can infer that Clusters c2 and c3 are from a similar execution context
while the others are from a different context. We also observe that the former group corresponds to
Flow 1 because of the additional system calls required for the FTP transfer. Also, the fewer number
of write and read system calls of the second group suggest that they belong to Flow 2. As expected,
within each group clusters are distinguished by write and read due to the varying sizes of images that
are compressed. The clustering results would be similar if MAXK was set to, for example, 2. In this case,
one cluster would have the points from Clusters c1, c4 and c5 combined but with different centroid and
similarly c2 and c3 would constitute another new cluster. This could, however, blur boundaries between
the execution contexts.
6.2 Accuracy
Now, we evaluate the accuracy of our intrusion detection methods. We enabled each of the attacks from
Section 5.3. For each attack type, we carried out 300 execution instances and measured how many times
the monitor detects malicious execution. An execution is considered malicious if any of the following
is true: (i) any system call other than the 14 observed types is detected; (ii) any system call whose
variance was zero during the profile (4 out of 14 in the case above) actually exhibits variance or (iii)
the distance of an observation from its closest cluster is longer than the threshold. Among these, rule
(i) was never observed in the cases of Attacks 1-3 because Attacks 1 & 2 re-used the same functions
from normal executions and Attack 3 makes no system calls at all. Table 2 summaries the results of our
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detection method as well as those of the sequence-based approach explained in Section 6.3. The results
of our SCFD method are as follows.
1. Attack 1 (HTTP post): All the executions were classified as malicious based on rule (ii) above since
one additional brk and sendto, each, were invoked. We tested the executions again, after removing
such obvious situations. The results, however, did not change – all the malicious executions were
caught by our monitor. Because of the additional HTTP request by the attack code, socket,
connect, close and stat were called more in both Flows 1 and 2. System call types other than
the ones mentioned here were consistent with the profile. With p0 = 1%, the results were the
same since the use of the additional system calls already increased the distances from clusters to
lie outside the acceptable boundaries.
2. Attack 2 (FTP upload): If the attack code executes on Flow 1, it is easily caught because of the
additional FTP transfer. As with the above, this attack changes some network related system
calls. This is enough to make the SCFDs fall outside the legitimate regions. The attack reads
the image file as well. This increases the usage of read system calls thus further highlighting the
anomalous behavior.
On the other hand, if the attack is launched on Flow 2 (that skips the FTP upload to the base
station), it may not be as easy to detect. Since the attack uses the same functions that are
invoked by legitimate code, it looks like the application is following Flow 1 (where the FTP
upload is actually legitimate). In this case, only 1% of the malicious code executions were caught.
The detection rates would be significantly higher if the attacker either used different images that
vary in size or used code that utilizes different combinations of system calls. The latter case would
also hold for the HTTP post attack. Note: the detection was not successful because we tailored
the attack instance to closely match legitimate execution (especially due to our knowledge of the
detection methods); however, many attacks will not be able to match legitimate execution in such
a precise manner and will end up being caught.
3. Attack 3 (Data corruption): This attack does not use any system calls; it just changes the values
of the data. However, this may affect the execution of code segments that follow, especially ones
that depend on the data – the JPEG compression. The attack code resets the raw image data by
using memset. This is compressed by the JPEG encoder that produces 15 KB of black images.
This attack was always caught by our monitor because these image sizes are not typical during
normal execution. Hence, calls to read and write were much less frequent when compared to
normal execution. The attack could have circumvented our detection method if, e.g., the raw
image is just replaced with another that has a similar after-compression size as the original or
only a part of the image is modified.9 But performing either of these actions may also trigger the
use of additional system calls that would be caught by our monitor.
4. Attack 4 (Shellcode execution): This attack was easily detected since it uses execve (used by the
shellcode) which was never observed during the profiling phase. Furthermore, it was followed by
a bunch of system calls including open, mmap, access, getuid, etc. This was due to the execution
of a shell, /bin/sh, spawned by the injected execve. In fact, INST_END was not executed since
execve does not return on success. Nevertheless, the attack could be detected because a watchdog
timer was used to wake up the secure monitor that then checks the application’s SCFD traced
until the timer expires. From this experiment it can be expected that our method can detect more
sophisticated shellcode [35] that uses unusual system calls, e.g., setreuid, setregid, etc.10
9If the attacker modified the compressed image, our method cannot detect it because the system call usage would
never change. This, however, does not fall into our threat model explained in Section 1.
10The shellcode used in our experiment is simpler than the ones targeted for Linux/x86 [35] due to the scarcity of
sophisticated shellcode for Linux/PowerPC.
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Table 2: Comparison between SCFD and PST (a sequence-based) methods.
Type SCFD PST Cause
Attack 1 100% 100%
SCFD: Extra network-related system calls
PST: Unusual transition (HTTP-HTTP)
Attack 2
(Flow 1) 100%
0% (N¯ = 3)
100% (N¯ = 5)
SCFD: Extra network- and file-related system calls
PST : Short sequence cannot capture unusual transition
(FTP-FTP)
Attack 2
(Flow 2) 1% 0% (both N¯) Both: Not differentible from legitimate Flow 1
Attack 3 100%
0% (N¯ = 3)
100% (N¯ = 5)
SCFD: Too small image size
PST: Short sequence cannot capture shortened write chain
Attack 4 100% 100% Both: execve was never seen
False Positives: The false positive rate is just as important as the detection rate because frequent
false alarms degrade system availability. To measure the false positive rates, we obtained a new set
of SCFDs by running the system without activating any attacks and measured how many times the
secure monitor classifies an execution as being suspicious. Most false positives in these tests were due
to the images sizes that, when compressed, fell below the normal ranges. For the cut-off distance θ
with p0 = 5%, 35 out of 2, 000 executions (1.75%) were classified as malicious. With p0 = 1%, i.e., a
farther cut-off distance, it was reduced to just 17 (0.85%). Such a lower significant level relaxes the cut-
off distance and produces fewer false alarms because even some rarely-seen data points are considered
normal. However, this may result in lower detection rates as well. In the attack scenarios listed above,
however, the results did not change even with p0 = 1%. This is a consideration for system designers to
take into account when implementing our intrusion detection methods; they will have a better feel for
when certain executions are normal and when some are not. Hence, they can decide to adjust values
for p0 based on the actual system(s) being monitored.
These results show that our method can effectively detect malicious execution contexts without
relying on complex analysis. While it is true that the accuracy of the method may depend on the
attacks that are launched against the system, in reality an attacker would need to not only know the
exact distributions of system call frequencies but also be able to implement an attack with such a limited
set of calls – both of these requirements significantly raise the difficulty levels for would-be attackers.
6.3 Comparison with Sequence-based Approach
To show how our detection method can effectively complement existing system call-based intrusion
detection methods, we compare it against a sequence-based approach using the same data set used in
the previous section. Among the existing methods (explained in Section 7), we use a variable-order
Markovian model (VMM) [2] using Probabilistic Suffix Tree (PST) [40, 6], due to its ability to learn
significant sequence patterns of different lengths. This enables us to calculate Pr(s(t)| s(t−N) · · · s(t−2)
s(t−1)), that is, the probability of a system call made at time t given a recent history, without having
to learn all or a fixed-length of the sequences (used by N -gram or fixed-order Markovian models). The
sequence length, N , varies with different patterns and is learned from their significance in the training
set.
PST learns the conditional probabilities in a (suffix) tree structure and thus requires a user defined
parameter N¯ that limits the maximum depth of the tree, i.e., the length of sequence pattern. We tested
two configurations: (i) N¯ = 3 and (ii) N¯ = 5 that show different results. Given the PST learned from
the training set, a test is carried out as follows: for each system call, we calculate its (conditional)
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probability using the PST and consider it malicious if the probability is less than a threshold of 1%.
An iteration (i.e., one execution) of the target application is classified as being malicious if any call is
classified as malicious. Table 2 summaries the results from the detection techniques.
1. Attack 1 (HTTP post): PST was able to detect Attack 1 because of this particular sequence:
sendto-close-write-write, where we have that Pr(wr|se− cl− wr) = 0 since in the legitimate
executions, sendto-close-write, the end of the HTTP logging function, is almost always followed
by stat. The last write, which is the beginning of the HTTP function caused an unusual
transition and hence detected by PST. On the other hand, SCFD detected the attack because of
the unusual frequencies of network-related system calls.
2. Attack 2 (FTP upload):11 In normal executions of Flow 1, the legitimate FTP operation ends
with this sequence: write-close-close-munmap-write. Then, the legitimate HTTP operation
starts with a write call. The extra FTP operation by Attack 2, which executes between the two
operations, starts with socket. With N¯ = 5, PST was able to detect the malicious executions
because of the unusual sequence. However, with N¯ = 3, it was not able to detect the extra
FTP operation on Flow 1 at all. This is because the sequence close-munmap-write-socket is a
legitimate one used at the boundary between File Write and the FTP upload stages (which is
described in Figure 2 in Section 1). That is, the short sequence of calls was not able to differentiate
the sequence from the ones generated by the transition between the legitimate FTP and the extra
FTP stages. For Flow 2, PST was not able to detect the attacks at all for any N¯ (in addition
to 3 and 5). This is because, as explained in Section 6.2, these executions are identical to the
legitimate executions on Flow 1. Hence, both SCFD and PST were not able to catch the attacks.
3. Attack 3 (Data corruption): This attack only alters the number of read and write calls. In
particular, the size of modified images affects the length of write chain in mmap-write-· · · -write-
close sequence made when writing the compressed JPEG image to a file (see ‘File Write’ stage in
Figure 2). When an attacker modifies the image, the length of the write chain becomes shorter.
However, PST with a short sequence (N¯ = 3) was not able to classify any of the executions as
being malicious because the length of the chain becomes 4 when the image is corrupted. Hence,
the malicious executions were detected with N¯ = 5, because the probability of seeing close after
mmap-write-write-write-write is zero given the training set. Note that, if the image size got
larger instead and thus made the write chain longer than usual, sequence-based methods cannot
detect this behavior because the only change would be that there are more chains of write that
have a legitimate length. SCFD, on other hand, can detect this type of attack easily.
4. Attack 4 (Shellcode execution): Attack 4 was easily caught by both methods because execve call
was never seen in the normal trace.
The results suggest that sequence-based approaches (the PSTmethod in our evaluation) are sensitive
to local, temporal variations, e.g., an unusual transition from write to write instead of to stat. Our
SCFD might not catch such a small, local variation.12 However, sequence-based approaches fail to detect
abnormal deviations in high-level, naturally variable execution contexts such as network activities or
diverse data. This is because these require a global view on the frequencies of different system call
types made during an entire execution. Hence, one can use these two approaches together to improve
the overall accuracy of the system call-based IDS for embedded systems. From the implementation
perspective, one may apply a sequence-based method to each system call observed and at the same
11Some of the executions included FTP server error (due to too many connections) that caused the malicious FTP
session to be disconnected. Both SCFD and PST classified such executions to be malicious and hence we excluded them
from the accuracy results.
12In fact it can because having the extra stat is a strong indicator of anomaly by our normal execution model shown
in Table 1.
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Table 3: Time Complexity of our Analysis
# of system Number of Avg. (Stdev.) of
call types instructions analysis times
5 2175 0.914 µs (0.553 µs)
10 4875 2.624 µs (1.405 µs)
14 8125 5.231 µs (1.965 µs)
time create an SCFD during an entire execution. Then, at the execution boundary, the SCFD method
can be applied to check if the high-level execution context is anomalous or not.
6.4 Time Complexity
To evaluate the time complexity of the proposed detection method, we measured the number of instruc-
tions retired by the function that finds the closest cluster (Eq. (3)) among the five clusters given a new
observation and the average time to perform the analysis.13
As Table 3 shows, the detection process is fast. This is possible because we store Σ−1, the inverse of
the covariance matrix, of each cluster, not Σ. A Mahalanobis distance is calculated in O(D2), whereD is
the number of system call types being monitored, since in (x∗−µ)TΣ−1(x∗−µ), the first multiplication
takes O(D2) and the second one takes O(D). Note that it would have taken O(D3) if we stored the
covariance matrix itself instead of its inverse; since a D ×D matrix inversion takes O(D3).
Note, again, that the monitoring and detection methods are not in the critical path, i.e., they do
not affect the execution of the applications we monitor since they are offloaded onto the secure core.
More importantly, the time complexity of our method is independent of how often and many times the
application uses system calls; it only depends on the number of system call types being monitored. This
is determined in the training phase and does not change during the monitoring phase (see Section 3.4).
On the other hand, the overheads of sequence-based approaches are highly dependent on the application
complexity (i.e., how many system calls are made). Hence, the deterministic time complexity of our
SCFD method makes it particularly suitable for embedded systems.
6.5 Limitations and Possible Improvements
One of the limitations of our detection algorithm is that it checks for intrusions after execution is
complete (at least for that invocation). Thus, if an attack tries to suddenly break the system, we
cannot detect or prevent it. Combining a sequence-based method with our SCFD can be a solution if
such attacks can be detectable by the former. If not, one can increase the chances of detection such
problems by splitting the whole execution range into blocks [45] and checking for the distribution of
system calls made in each block as soon as the execution passes each block boundary. This, however,
would need more computation in the secure core at run-time, more storage in the SPM and a few more
code modifications.
Another way to handle this problem is to combine this analysis/detection with other behavioral
signals, especially ones that have a finer granularity of checks, e.g., timing [45]. Since some blocks may
use very few system calls (perhaps none) or even a very stable subset of such calls we can monitor
the execution time spent in such a block to reduce the SCFD-based overheads (which is still low).
This keeps the profile from bloating and prevents the system from having to carry out the legitimacy
tests. We can also use the timing information in conjunction with the system call distribution; i.e.,
by learning the normal time to execute a distribution of system calls, we can enforce a policy where
each application block executes all of its system calls within (fairly) tight ranges. This is, of course,
13Simics is not a cycle-accurate simulator. Thus, the times are measured on a real machine with Intel Core I5 1.3GhZ
dual-core processor. The analysis code is compiled with −O0 option. The statistic is based on 10, 000 samples.
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provided that the system calls themselves do not show unpredictable timing behavior. This makes it
much harder for an attacker who imitates system calls [43] or one that replaces certain system calls
with malicious functions [41].
Our model represents the histograms of system calls. In fact, each signature (histogram) would
be represented by a mixture of multinomial distributions. That is, our model assumes generative
models which select a mixture of multinomial parameters and then generate a histogram of system calls.
Here, we assume that each multinomial distribution can be accurately represented by the multivariate
Gaussian distributions (the multivariate Gaussian approximation of multinomial for large numbers of
samples). In this regard, the assumption on our model is closely related to the topic model such as
Latent Dirichlet Allocation [4, 3]. Here, we build a pragmatic lightweight module. One of the main
drawbacks of the k-means clustering algorithm is that one may need to know or predefine the number
of clusters. That is, system behaviors should be correctly represented by k numbers of multinomial
(Gaussian) distributions of histogram. Some large-scale systems would have many heterogeneous modes
(distributions). In this case, the appropriate solutions would be using non-parametric topic models such
as Dirichlet process. However, we empirically observed that many embedded systems with predictable
behavior can be represented by a tractable number of clusters. Thus, we use a simpler model with the
k-means cluster.
7 Related Work
Forrest et al. [14] build a database of look-ahead pairs of system calls; for each system call type, what
is the next ith system call for i = 1, 2, up to N . Then, given a longer sequence of length L > N ,
the percentage of mismatches is used as the metric to determine abnormality. Hofmeyr et al. [16]
extends the method by profiling unique sequences of fixed length N , called an N-gram, to reduce the
database size. The legitimacy test for a given sequence of length N is carried out by calculating the
smallest Hamming distance between it and the all sequences in the database. The N-gram model
requires a prior assumption on suitable N because it affects the accuracy as well as the database size.
Marceau [29] proposes a finite state machine (FSM) based prediction model to relax these requirements
and Eskin et al. [12] further improves by employing a wild-card for compact sequence representation.
Markovian techniques such as Hidden Markov model (HMM) [44] and variable-order Markov chain [40]
have also been explored. Chandola et al. [6] provides an extensive survey on various anomaly detection
techniques for discrete sequences. A similar approach to our work is [5], in which the system call counts
of Android applications (traced by a software tool called strace) are used to find malicious apps. Using
a crowdsourcing, the approach collects the system call counts of a particular application from multiple
users and applies k-means (with Euclidean distance metric) to divide them into two clusters. A smaller
cluster is considered to be malicious based on the assumption that benign apps are the majority.
There has also been work on system call arguments monitoring. Mutz et al. [32] introduce several
techniques to test anomalies in argument lengths, character distribution, argument grammar, etc. Maggi
et al. [26] use a clustering algorithm to group system call invocations that have similar arguments.
As previously mentioned, the usual way of system call instrumentation relies on an audit module
in the OS layer. Hardware-based system call monitoring mechanism can improve the overall security
of the system by cutting off a potential vulnerability – the software audit module. Pfoh et al., [34]
proposed Nitro, a hardware-based system call tracing system where system calls made inside virtual
machines in manner similar to ours (Section 4.2). We note that our detection method (Section 3) is
orthogonal to how system calls are traced. Hence we can implement it on systems like Nitro. Other
types of instrumentation include static analysis of program source code [42] and user-level processes for
system call interposition [17].
The SecureCore architecture [45] takes advantage of the redundancy of a multicore processor; a secure
core is used to monitor the run-time execution behavior of target applications running on a monitored
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core. The original architecture is designed to watch applications timing behavior. [46] extends the
architecture by building a memory behavior monitoring framework for system-wide anomaly detection
in real-time embedded systems. There also exists some work in which a multicore processor (or a
coprocessor) is employed as a security measure, such as [7, 20, 9, 30, 25] for instruction-grain monitoring.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we presented a lightweight intrusion detection method that uses application execution
contexts learned from system call frequency distributions of embedded applications. We demonstrated
that the proposed detection mechanism could effectively complement sequence-based approaches by
detecting anomalous behavior due to changes in high-level execution contexts. We also proposed certain
architectural modifications to aid in the monitoring and analysis process. The approaches presented in
the paper are limited in terms of the target applications and demonstration. Hence, as future work, we
intend to implement the proposed architecture on a soft processor core [22] and to evaluate our method
with real-world applications. We also plan to improve the learning and analysis methods using the
topic modeling approach (explained in Section 6.5) to deal with large-scale heterogeneous behaviors of
complex embedded applications.
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APPENDIX
A Cutoff Distance
In general, there is no analytic solution for calculating the cumulative distribution function (CDF) for
multivariate normal distributions. However, it is possible to derive the CDF with Mahalanobis distance.
The cutoff distance θ can be derived by finding the smallest distance that makes the probability that a
data point x, which in fact belongs to the cluster and has a distance farther than θ, is not greater than
p0 = 0.01 or 0.05.
First, let z be a Mahalanobis distance from a multivariate normal distribution. Then,∫ θ
0
c · e− 12 z2dz = 1− p0, (5)
where c is a normalizing constant that satisfies Eq. (5) with θ = ∞ and p0 = 0 by the definition of a
probability density function. This results in c = 1/1.25331 because∫ ∞
0
e−
1
2 z
2
dz w
[
1.25331 · erf(0.707107 · z)
]∞
0
= 1.25331,
where erf(z) is the error function and is 1 and 0 for z = ∞ and z = 0, respectively. Accordingly, Eq.
(5) becomes
1
1.25331
∫ θ
0
e−
1
2 z
2
dz w 1
1.25331
[
1.25331 · erf(0.707107 · z)
]θ
0
= erf(0.707107 · θ) = 1− p0.
Therefore, the cutoff distance θ for a significant level p0 is
θ =
erf−1(1− p0)
0.707107
. (6)
For p0 = 1% and 5%, θ ∼ 2.57583 and 1.95996, respectively. Figure 9 shows the cutoff distance for
0% ≤ p0 ≤ 100%. The cutoff distance is not bounded (i.e., θ = ∞) when p0 = 0% and is 0 when
p0 = 100%.
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Figure 9: The cutoff distance θ for significant level p0.
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